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IN T R O D U C T IO N
The problems which arise out of the possibility of liability from 
highway defects appears to be of recent vintage. But, in reality, these 
are old problems which have taken on new meaning as a result of two 
simultaneous occurrences. The first of these is the erosion of the doc­
trine of sovereign immunity and the consequent vulnerability of high­
way people to suit, and the second is the outcry by those factions that 
imagine all highway personnel to be involved in the process of ecocide.
The long journey in the womb of justice to which the maintenance 
people have been subjected has not prepared them any better for the 
blinding flash of the sword of liability than the amniotic fluid protect­
ing the infant in its mother’s womb has prepared it for the shrill din 
and bright light of entry into the world.
So suddenly, the men of the law have been grappled onto as the 
benefactors of rational thought. We hear statements like, “If anyone 
can counter the thrust of liability suits, surely it is the lawyers.” But 
countering the thrust of liability suits is not, nor should be, the only 
function of the lawyer in the field of highway law. We have an oppor­
tunity now to turn this colloqium of like-minded people reaching for 
answers into a tightly meshed and integrated system with a purpose— 
that purpose being to fulfill the desires of the traveling public and to 
do so in a safe, orderly and just manner.
The safety is your part, the order is that of the general highway 
administrators, and the justice is ours. Some of the things I shall say 
might give offense to my brothers-in-law—liability suits feed a lot of 
people, therefore, any tampering with the status quo is bound to bring 
squeals of anguish. But if our duty is to be fulfilled, we will have to 
rise above the pedestrian inclinations of parochial interests. A new sys­
tem must be developed.
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In line with this thinking, I recently approached a colleague at the 
Highway Research Board. He conceived of the lawyers as the movers 
and shakers of the political system and felt that draft codification could 
be very useful in solving some problems endemic to the maintenance 
area. Well, it may be that lawyers are the movers and shakers of 
the legislative system, but if this is so, I contend that it is not in 
their function of lawyers q u a  lawyers. It is the lawyer as lobbyist, the 
activator who acts upon the lawyer as representative, the activated who 
formulates and enacts draft legislation. If this is the answer—a massive 
assault on the legislative system—then the people you need at your meet­
ings, schools and conferences are the public relation men. As fear of 
liability has a way of spreading into paranoia, more and more money 
will be necessary—in fact in direct proportion to the decrease in avail­
able time and it is beyond my comprehension to perceive the source of 
such funds to the average state highway department.
Out of all else that is learned in a school of law, three things 
explicitly remain for life, and one thing implicitly remains. First, let 
us discuss the explicit lessons. Of primary importance for us today is 
the deep pocket theory. The mutual contradictions of space-age society, 
a growing affluence accompanied by a statis in the relative wealth of 
the average man, did not fail to leave their mark on the theorists of 
the early sixties. And so in keeping with the increasing tendencies to 
operate the government on welfare lines, a formula was born which 
would protect against a buckling of individual resources by financial 
pressures in times of crisis or emergency. The formula reads something 
like this: society has far more resources than the individual citizen; 
it is unfair to make the individual citizen cope with financial emer­
gency by himself; hence, society should be made to help the citizen. 
O r put more simply, the deepest pocket should foot the bill—the deepest 
pocket being the state.
The second lesson of the law fits perfectly at this point. This lesson 
holds that you should never let the camel get his nose under the tent. 
To put it in the vernacular and tie it in with our previous discussion, 
once someone gets a nose into the deep pocket, the head is sure to 
follow.
But before we are accused of rank pessimism, let us discuss the 
third lesson. This lesson states that whatever one lawyer writes, an­
other can unwrite; so there is still light at the end of the tunnel. Why 
then haven’t more solons of the bar stepped forward? A simple rea­
son—the real money is in doing the suing. Those people advancing the 
theories of liability prevalent today are the sharp ones. No matter what
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their motivations, they get the job done. The offices of the states’ 
Attorneys’ General are overworked and understaffed today. In addi­
tion, the majority of their personnel are the young lawyers learning 
their trade and preparing to step over the line to the opposite side. 
While this is a generality and generalities are always unfair, I have 
libeled no one and merely attempt to point out some reasons for the 
current state of affairs.
I also mentioned an implicit lesson and this is the most important 
of all. The law exists to protect the status quo and, if anyone says 
differently, he is a dangerous man. I don’t mean this in as harsh a 
sense as it sounds, certainly not in the “new left” sense. In the area 
of tort liability, I feel strongly that everyone should receive just recom­
pense for any injury received at all, but as a taxpayer, I fully realize 
that it is not in my interests to provide an ever-expanding larder for 
profiteers, middle-men, and shysters. And I use that term to connote 
the absolute denigration which it signifies. Thus, the law must operate 
in this area to ensure just recovery when legitimate, but also, to protect 
the citizen as taxpayer, and this usually means the status quo.
SOVEREIGN IM M U N IT Y
The initial consideration in any study of liability resulting from tort 
claims is that of governmental immunity. This concept finds its origins 
in early English common law. At its inception, the doctrine was inter­
preted to hold that “the King can do no wrong”, or basically that the 
King coul l^ not be the object of any suit arising out of the wrong doings 
of his officers without his consent.
This doctrine has been adequately discussed in other sources and it 
is assumed that the reader has some knowledge of its philosophical and 
practical applications. The doctrine was adopted into the American 
judicial system with the state replacing the King as the beneficiary of 
immunity. There are several early cases dealing with this adoption and 
focusing on the necessity for the state to remain above the law which 
it brings forth.1 W e will not here attempt to enter into a discussion of 
the foundations of the doctrine, either those founded in jurisprudence 
or in economics.
Criticism has accompanied the doctrine for the better part of a 
century and, although much maligned and attacked, it retains vitality 
to this day. The law has been called obsolete and worse, and it ap­
1 See: U .  S .  v. L e e ,  106 U.S. 196 (1882) and v. P o l y b l a n k ,
205 U.S. 353 (1907).
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peared that the case of S t o n e  v. A r i z o n a  H i g h w a y  C o m m i s s i o n ,  381 
P.2d 107 (Ariz., 1963), sounded the death knell for the doctrine as 
it related to highways.
The S t o n e  case was an action for wrongful death and injuries suf­
fered in an auto accident. The court accepted the facts as the plaintiff 
had set forth. The facts stated that, as the plaintiff approached a high­
way intersection on which recent construction efforts had been under­
taken, markings and signing, which had been located at that spot direct­
ing traffic to turn left on a curve in the old road, had not been removed. 
The new road had no such curve and the plaintiff was misled into turn­
ing left which resulted in the vehicular collision which is the subject of 
this suit.
The lower court had dismissed the case on the basis of governmental 
immunity and in reviewing this decision, Justice Lockwood of the Ari­
zona Supreme Court said rather summarily,
W e are of the opinion that when a reason for a certain rule no 
longer exists, the rule itself should be abandoned. After a thorough 
re-examination of the rule of governmental immunity from tort lia­
bility, we now hold that it must be discarded as a rule of law in 
Arizona and all prior decisions to the contrary are hereby over­
ruled.—
The court looked to the origins of the immunity doctrine and dis­
cussed its applicability to cities, county hospitals, and school districts. 
I t is of special importance to us here, however, that the court noted 
the lessening stringency of the doctrine as regards cities. The reason 
given by the court is the distinction between ministerial and govern­
mental duties, of which we shall have more to say later.
The court further referred to other cases which dealt with sovereign 
immunity and participated in the doctrine’s denigration.2 The court 
then discussed the theory of r e s p o n d e a t  s u p e r io r  as the reasoning for 
absolving individual highway commission employees of liability and im­
puting such to the state.
The S t o n e  decision appeared to be the culmination of a long and 
persistent fight to do away with sovereign immunity. But the doctrine 
is dying hard.
2 See: M o l i t o r  v. K a n e l a n d  C o m m u n i t y  U n t .  D i s t .  N o .  3 0 2 ,  163 N.E. 2d 89 
(1959) ; M u s k o p f  v. C o r n i n g  H o s p i t a l  D i s t . ,  359 P.2d 457 (1961) ; W i l l i a m s  v. 
C i t y  o f  D e t r o i t ,  111 N.W. 2d 1 (1961) ; H o l y t z  v. C i t y  o f  M i l w a u k e e ,  115 
N.W. 2d 618 (1962) ; and S p a n e l  v. M o u n d s  V i e w  S c h o o l  D i s t . ,  118 N.W. 2d 
795 (1962).
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A brief discussion of the state of the doctrine at present will serve 
to give the reader a good view of the implications involved. As regards 
counties, there are several applications of the doctrine. Generally, how­
ever, the courts have interpreted counties to be the political arms of 
the state, and when acting in that capacity they have been protected by 
the state’s sovereign immunity. There have also been acknowledgements 
that county operations as related to highways, i.e., maintenance, are in 
the realm of governmental functions and protected from liability.3 But 
it has also been held that liability will ensue where county negligence 
is present, irregardless of the nature of the function.4
Counties are also affected through a statutory waiver of a state’s 
immunity and liability has been vested statutorily in other instances.
State highway administrative bodies are affected only through a 
statutory waiver of immunity and absent such the protection of immu­
nity remains strong.5 That the law is changing rapidly in this area is 
pointed out in the following cases. In B a z a n a c  v. S t a t e , D e p a r t m e n t  
o f  H i g h w a y s , 218 So. 2d 121 (La., 1969), the Court of Appeals of 
Louisiana held that a statute which authorized the state highway de­
partment to sue or be sued did not waive tort immunity. But in H e r r i n  
v. P e r r y , 222 So. 2d 649, (La., 1969), the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
ruled that a statute which authorized the highway department to sue 
or be sued did waive sovereign immunity.6
3 But as an example of change see: K l e p i n g e r  v. B o a r d  o f  C o m m r ’s o f  
C o u n t y  o f  M i a m i , 239 N.E. 2d 160 (Ind., 1968), where bridge repair work was 
held to be ministerial and where negligence resulted in liability.
4 R i c e  v. C l a r k  C o u n t y , 382 P.2d 605 (Nev., 1963).
5 See: T h o m a s  v. B a i r d ,  252 A.2d 653 (Pa., 1969), where the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania held that the Turnpike Commission was an instrumentality of 
the state engaged in a governmental function (where a collision involved a 
highway truck stopped on a highway) and hence was immune from liability 
for employee negligence; J o h n s o n  v. C a l l i s t o ,  176 N.W. 2d 754 (Minn., 1970), 
where the Supreme Court of Minnesota was asked to reject by judicial fiat the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court refused to do so on the grounds 
that any change would have to be legislative.
6 For a further discussion of sovereign immunity in the recent past, see the 
following: A r n o l d  v. S h u m p e r t ,  217 S. 2d 116 (Fla., 1968) ; L u s i e t t o  v. K i n g a n ,  
246 N.E. 2d 24 (111., 1969) ; L o w n d e s  C o u n t y  v. M i s s i s s i p p i  S t a t e  H i g h w a y  
C o m m i s s i o n ,  220 So. 2d 349 (Miss., 1969) ; P h i l l i p s  v. T o w n  o f  F o r t h  O g l e ­
t h o r p e ,  162 S.E. 2d 771 (Ga., 1968); R a p p e  v. C a r r ,  167 S.E. 2d 48 (N.C., 
1969) ; S h e a l o r  v. R u u d ,  221 So. 2d 765 (Fla., 1969).
Also note for special attention: R o g e r s  v. S t a t e ,  459 P.2d 378 (Hawaii, 1969). 
An action was brought against the state to recover for injuries received in 
an automobile accident allegedly due to the state’s negligence in the placement
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On the federal level, sovereign immunity was waived in some in­
stances by the F e d e r a l  T o r t  C l a i m s  A c t , T itle 28 U.S.C.A. 1346. 
There is a key section of this act, however, 28 U.S.C.A. 2680, which 
deals with exemptions from such consent to suit. The act states:
§ 2680. Exceptions
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title
shall not apply to—
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of 
the government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
This section has special importance to us for the simple reason that 
it excludes discretionary acts from the liability waiver. Traditionally, 
discretionary has been used synonomously with governmental which is 
also excluded from liability and many maintenance and engineering 
functions have been considered as being governmental acts of discretion.
W e have discussed heretofore the implications of the concept of 
sovereign immunity. However, further delineation is necessary prior to 
looking at specific cases. At common law, liability, in light of sovereign 
immunity, was dependent upon whether an act could be considered as 
falling within the “governmental” sphere of activities, or whether it 
was merely “ministerial” in nature. Likewise, even with the coming 
of the F e d e r a l  T o r t  C l a i m s  A c t ,  the discretionary exemption provisions, 
Title 28 § 2680, s u p r a  the ultimate question would focus on the govern­
mental or proprietary question.
In light of this consideration, it behooves us to clarify the distinc­
tion between “governmental” and “ministerial” functions. Throughout 
this discussion, as in the case law and literature available upon the 
subject, the term “proprietary” is used interchangeably with “minis­
terial”.
of traffic signs and the painting of the center line stripes. The state contended 
that the matter was not actionable by reason of the provisions of an exception 
contained in the State Tort Liability Act which excepted the state from liabil­
ity for the act of its agents and servants involving the performance of a “dis­
cretionary” function or duty. The court held that the placement of traffic signs 
and the painting of road stripes was an “operational” function, rather than a 
“discretionary” function, and hence that the state was not exempt from suit 
under the exception contained in the Tort Liability Act.
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regula­
t io n s  be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function 
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of 
the government, whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused.—
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Before looking at the case law extant on the subject, we looked to 
B la c k ' s  L a w  D i c t i o n a r y ,  Revised Fourth Edition, in order to obtain a 
working concept of the phrases involved. B l a c k ' s  provided us with the 
following:
Governmental act—an act in exercise of police power or in exercise 
of legislative, discretionary, or judicial powers conferred in munic­
ipality for benefit of public.
Ministerial duty—one regarding which nothing is left to discre­
tion—a simple and definite duty, imposed by law, and arising under 
conditions admitted or proved to exist.—
The cases are much too numerous to cite which discuss the distinc­
tion and by far the great majority concern themselves with non-highway 
matters.7 W e will, however, discuss here a representative highway case 
which depicts the state of the proposition in question.
Prior to this, however, it must be made clear that although the 
general rule has long held that there is no vested liability for damage 
occurring as a result of a governmental activity, there is room for dis­
cussion as to what exactly qualifies as such an activity. For example, 
the operation of a state ferry boat as part of the highway system is 
considered to be governmental,8 the protection and promotion of game 
by the state is considered governmental,9 and the maintenance of insane 
asylums is considered governmental.10 1 These examples are used mainly 
to give the reader a flavor of the breadth of governmental activities.
The case of F o n s e c a  v. S t a t e ,  297 S.W. 2d 199 (Texas, 1957) dis­
cussed an action for injuries which was brought against the state as a 
result of a collision between an auto and a state highway department 
maintenance truck. The court said:
In B r o o k s  v. S t a t e ,  supra, it was expressly held that the location, 
construction and maintenance of state highways by the Texas High­
way Department is a governmental function. It is equally well 
settled that the state is not liable for the torts and negligence of 
its officers, agents or servants or employees engaged in the perform­
ance of a governmental function, unless it has expressly assumed 
such authority— A 1
7 See: 38 A M .  J U R . ,  Municipal Corp., §§601 et seq., 40 ALR 927, S t a t e ' s  
I m m u n i t y  f r o m  T o r t  L i a b i l i t y  a s  d e p e n d e n t  o n  g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r  p r o p r i e t a r y  
n a t u r e  o f  f u n c t i o n .
8 M a n i o n  v. S t a t e  H i g h w a y  C o m ’n, 5 N.W. 2d 527 (1942).
9 C o m m o n w e a l t h  v. M a s d e n ,  175 S.W. 2d 1004 (1943).
10 I V e lc h  v. S t a t e ,  148 S.W. 2d 876 (1941).
11 A m a t o  v. C i t y  o f  N e w  Y o r k ,  268 F.Supp. 705 (N.Y., 1967); B a r n u m  v. 
S t a t e ,  435 P.2d 678 (Wash., 1967) ; K r z y s z t a l o w s k i  v. F o r t i n ,  230 A.2d 750
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So then, it can be postulated that the general rule holds true, that 
is, that where a division of government performs an act which is within 
the “governmental” sphere it will be protected from liability. But when 
the action in question falls within the “ministerial” function, liability 
will generally ensue.
GENERAL D U T IE S AND L IA B IL IT Y  AS A 
R ESU LT O F SLIPPERY C O N D IT IO N S
In this section we will briefly discuss the general duties of highway 
personnel and then take a specific case example of the application of 
the law thereto. Rather than go into each individual requirement of 
the law, such as barricades, lights and warning signs, I have decided 
to discuss in detail the ramifications of ice, snow and water on the 
highway.
Basically, the law of maintenance is that a highway traveler law­
fully using the highway is entitled to have that highway maintained 
in a reasonably safe condition. But it is just as elemental to note 
that the state does not function in the role of guarantor as regards 
safety, nor does it insure against injury resulting from obstructions or 
defects in the highway unless specifically required to do so by statute.
I t is of primary importance then to establish that the one significant 
duty of maintenance operatives, in the absence of statute law to con­
trary, is to exercise reasonable diligence to put and keep highways in 
a r e a s o n a b ly  s a fe  c o n d i t i o n  for the uses to which they are subject.12
While this principle was established some time ago and the inter­
vening years have seen an increased traffic flow and consequent altered 
traffic patterns, there has been little alteration in this duty to exercise 
ordinary care and prudence under existing circumstances.
The duty to use proper and reasonable care allows wide latitude in 
the exercise of administrative discretion. Continuing supervision and 
inspection are axiomatic, but it is also axiomatic that there is no lia­
bility for the consequences of unusual or extraordinary occurrences.
(N.H., 1967) ; B r o w n  v. C i t y  o f  O m a h a , 160 N.W. 2d 805 (Neb., 1968) ; L e w i s  
v. S t a t e , 289 F.Supp. 246 (Vt., 1968); S h e f f i e l d  v. T u r n e r ,  445 P.2d 367 (Utah, 
1968) ; S m i t h  v. C l i n t o n d a l e  S c h o o l  D i s t . ,  165 N.W. 2d 332 (Mich., 1968) ; 
C a r r o l l  v. K i t t l e ,  457 P.2d 21 (Kan., 1969) ; M a k i  v. C i t y  o f  E a s t  T a w a s ,  
170 N.W. 2d 530 (Mich., 1969); P e r k i n s  v. S t a t e ,  251 N.E. 2d 30 (Ind., 1969).
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but is illustrative of the generality 
of the rule.
12 S t r i c k f a d e n  v. G r e e n c r e e k  H i g h w a y  D i s t . ,  248 P. 456 (Idaho, 1926).
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In the case of M c C u l l i n  v. S t a t e , D e p a r t m e n t  o f  H i g h w a y s , 216 
So. 2d 832 (La., 1968), the plaintiff was injured in an accident aris­
ing out of an alleged defect in the graveled road. There was adequate 
testimony in the case from which the court could find regular main­
tenance and inspection. In addressing itself to this point, the court said:
The State of Louisiana owes to the public a duty to maintain its 
highways so they will be in a reasonably safe condition for the 
traveling public at all times. This duty encompasses an obligation 
to have an efficient and continuous system of inspection of the high­
ways and bridges. The highway department, however, is not re­
quired to maintain a perfect condition of repair or system of inspec­
tion, but its officers and employees are required to use ordinary and 
reasonable care in order to insure that the highways and bridges will 
be in a reasonably safe condition, (cite omitted).
This duty to use ordinary care referred to by the court has been 
interpreted to involve an anticipation of defects which could result 
naturally from use or climatic conditions and in the absence of antici­
pation thereof, liability may well ensue.13
The case of S h a w  v. S t a t e , 290 N.Y.S. 2d 602 (N.Y. Ct. CL, 
1968), involved a wrongful death claim which resulted from an acci­
dent in which the occupant of a stranded car was killed when he stood 
conversing with the occupants of another vehicle which had stopped 
partially on and partially off the highway and which was struck by an 
oncoming vehicle. The plaintiff claimed negligence in the maintenance 
of the highway. There was testimony that there was snow on the road 
and that it was cold, but it had not snowed on the day of the accident. 
There were gusts of wind and conditions were similar throughout the 
immediate area.
In holding that the state was not negligent, the court said:
— In the exercise of reasonable care and maintenance t h e  s t a t e  is n o t  
r e q u i r e d  to  go  to  th e  l i m i t s  o f  h u m a n  i n g e n u i t y  to  a c c o m p l i s h  s a f e t y  
o f  th e  h i g h w a y ,  (cite omitted). The brief period of time during 
which the snow condition due to weather and gusty wind conditions 
had existed was not sufficient to constitute constructive notice to the 
state which imposed negligence on it for failure to sand. Mere 
presence of snow or ice on the highway in the wintertime and the 
mere fact that a vehicle skidded thereon do not constitute negligence 
on the part of the state, (cite omitted). Under the weather con­
ditions prevailing that afternoon and early evening there was an 
element of hazard which was obvious and reliance could not 
be placed on the presumption of the safety of the highway, (cite
13 The general rule is that the frequency of inspection depends on the con­
dition, location and circumstances surrounding the alleged cause of the injury.
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omitted). The cause of the accident cannot be attributed to the
state under the facts herein.— (emphasis added)
It has further been held that the discharge of the duty in accord­
ance with generally accepted engineering standards and practices meets 
the test of reasonable care.14
In the January 1971 issue, the magazine P u b l i c  W o r k s  discusses a 
case which was in the area of liability for ice and snow on the high­
way. This particular case, W a l k e r  v. C o u n t y  o f  C o c o n i n o , 473 P.2d 
472 (Ariz., 1970), which was decided in August 1970, is interesting 
because it presents a complete discussion in capsule form of the rami­
fications of the legal aspects in this area.
Stated briefly, the fact situation involved a claimant motorist who 
after traversing a rise and proceeding on a downhill curve encountered 
a patch of ice whose dimensions were approximately 100 yards by the 
width of the highway. The claimant skidded thereon and came to rest 
with his vehicle protruding into traffic whereupon he was injured when 
an oncoming vehicle struck his vehicle.
There were no barricades present nor was there any evidence of 
salt, sand, gravel or cinders on the ice. The day was clear and there 
had been no storm for two days previous to the accident. There was 
no evidence that the ice was the result of anything but a natural 
accumulation.
The court held that no recovery should be granted. There was no 
evidence of notice, either actual or constructive and even if construc­
tive notice were present, there was no evidence of sufficient time to 
ameliorate the condition, nor any evidence as to what precautionary 
measures would have been reasonable.
The crux of this case is the odyssey of the court in formulating its 
reasoning. In distillate form, the rule of law which emerges from the 
case is that if a roadway should suddenly and without fault of the 
governmental body, come by any means into a condition dangerous to 
travel, the governmental body is liable for damages occasioned thereby 
if the governmental body fails to act in a reasonably prudent manner 
under the circumstances. S e e  in th is  r e g a r d :  B a b c o c k  v. S t a t e , 191 
N.Y.S. 2d 783 (N.Y., 1 1959); S t e r n  v. S t a t e , 224 N.Y.S. 2d 126 
(N.Y., 1962) ; and F r e e p o r t  T r a n s p o r t , I n c , ,  v. C o m m o n w e a l t h ,  D e p t ,  
o f  H w y s . ,  408 S.W. 2d 193 (Ky., 1966).
l ^ L e g g  v. C i t y  o f  N e w  O r l e a n s ,  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t .  D i v .  o f  T r .  E . ,  219 So. 
2d 798 (La., 1969).
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The general rule which is applicable in slippery condition cases can 
be summarized as follows: The mere facts of the presence of ice on 
the highway and a car skidding thereon does not impose liability on 
the governmental body p e r  se. There need be evidence of a cognizable 
duty and failure to perform that duty before liability can be imputed. 
As we can see, this general principle is an outline form of the rule 
of law derived from the W a l k e r  case. S e e :  E d w a r d s  v. S t a t e , 159 
N.Y.S. 2d 589 (N.Y., 1957) ; and G l a d s t o n e  v. S t a t e ,  256 N.Y.S. 2d 
493 (N.Y., 1965).
There is a split of authority in this case. The W a l k e r  court dis­
cussed a ‘natural accumulation of ice’ on the highway as being one 
which, “—occurs where rain or snow falls on the roadway or runoff 
from thawing snow falls across the street, and subsequently freezes 
causing ice to form on the road. In such a case the moisture on the 
roadway results wholly from the elements and is not caused by any 
act of the governmental body.”
So then, liability attaches in the following circumstances:
(1) ice has been formed by pushing or some other method into 
diverse shapes or such size and location so as to constitute 
an obstruction or dangerous condition apart from mere slip­
periness. S e e :  C h r i s t o  v. D o t s o n , 155 S.E. 2d 571 (W.Va., 
1967) ; and B o y  l a n d  v. C i t y  o f  P a r k e r s b u r g , 90 S.E. 347.
(2) the condition is unusual in comparison with general conditions 
(isolated patches). S e e :  B a b c o c k , S u p r a . ;  and J e n n i n g s  v. 
U . S . ,  207 F.Supp. 143 (D.C., M d , 1962).
(3) actual or constructive knowledge exists. S e e :  B a b c o c k , S u p r a . ;  
J e n n i n g s , S u p r a . ;  S t e r n ,  S u p r a . ;  F r e e p o r t  T r a n s p o r t ,  S u p r a . ;  
and W h e e l e r  v. S t a t e ,  156 N.Y.S. 2d 660 (N.Y., 1956).
(4) opportunity was present after notice to repair or remedy the 
condition.
At this point the court cites the case of W e i s n e r  v. M a y o r  a n d  
C o u n c i l  o f  R o c k v i l l e ,  225 A.2d 648 (M d., 1967), a case which dis­
cussed liability arising out of ice and snow conditions in general terms. 
Maryland law as laid out in this case conforms to general law in that 
a person has a right to lawfully use the public thoroughfares and to 
expect that such will be reasonably safe for passage. Of course, this 
does not operate in such a manner as to make the government an in­
surer of safe passage. In citing the earlier Maryland case of L e o n a r d  
v. L e e ,  62 A.2d 259 (M d., 1948), the court said: “—Where there 
are dangerous obstructions or depressions of which th e  m u n ic ip a l  a u ­
th o r i t i e s  h a v e  a c t u a l  n o t ic e  o r  w h i c h  h a v e  e x i s t e d  l o n g  e n o u g h  to  g i v e  
c o n s t r u c t i v e  n o t i c e ,  a municipality is liable if a person is injured because
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of such condition.— ” The court in this case further refers to M c Q u i l ­
l a n ,  § 54.114 pp. 425-427, wherein it was stated that the mere knowl­
edge of a heavy snowfall, or a freeze, does not ordinarily mean notice 
of a particular danger.
Hence, the position of the Maryland courts, as summed up in W e i s -  
n e r ,  is:
In dealing with snow and ice cases and the obligation of a 
municipality to keep its public ways clear with respect thereto, this 
court has been conscious of the need to protect the public from 
callous and indifferent municipal administration with regard to such 
conditions. — However, it has also been sensate to the undesirable 
results which may follow if a Pandora’s Box is opened by exposing 
a municipality to liability not kept within reasonable bounds.
Underlying these general rules of liability is the doctrine of reason- 
ability—the standard being that of the reasonably prudent man. This 
standard has long been established in Arizona as set forth in C i t y  o f  
P h o e n i x  v. C l e m ,  237 P. 168 (1925). In summary version, the stand­
ard is much the same as that discussed in the Maryland cases. The 
court also cited the case of K l a t t  v. M i l w a u k e e ,  10 N.W . 162, 40 
Am.Rep. 759, from which the W a l k e r  case derived its rule of law.
In applying this standard, some courts have ruled a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  
l a w ,  that there is no liability for natural accumulations regardless of 
notice or length of time and regardless of whether conditions are gen­
eral or isolated where mere slipperiness is the only danger presented. 
S e e :  C o m m o n w e a l t h  v. B r o w n ,  346 S.W. 2d 24 (Ky., 1961), wherein 
ice had been on the highway with highway department knowledge for 
36 hours prior to an accident. The department had in no way con­
tributed to the condition—it simply had not cleared the snow or ice 
at the locus of the accident. The court here held that there was no 
affirmative duty on the part of the state to remove snow and ice even 
though the state had assumed that responsibility on a regular basis for 
years. This was considered to be a gratuity.
Additionally, based on the recognition that a governmental body 
cannot control the falling of snow and ice and the freezing thereof— 
it is felt in some quarters that it would place an impractical burden 
on the government to require it to keep its highways free of ice in 
the wdnter. S e e :  N e b e l  v. C i t y  o f  P i t t s b u r g h , 126 A.2d 449 (1956). 
A l s o  s e e :  C i t y  o f  S o u t h  B e n d  v. F i n k ,  219 N.E. 2d 441 (Ind., 1966) ; 
E c k e r l i n  v. S t a t e ,  184 N.Y.S. 2d 778 (N.Y., 1959) ; D o d d  v. S t a t e ,  
223 N.Y.S. 2d 32, T e t r e a u l t  v. S t a t e ,  269 N.Y.S. 2d 812 (N.Y., 
1966) ; and, the dissenting opinion of Justice Montgomery in C o m m o n ­
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w e a l t h  v. G e n e r a l  &  E x c e s s  I n s u r a n c e  C o . ,  355 S.W. 2d 695 (Ky., 
1962).
But, the W a l k e r  court held that to limit liability according to the 
obstruction philosophy reiterated above is unreasonable. According to 
the court, “Ice in its natural state of slipperiness appears to this court 
to be at least as dangerous to travel as ice which has been pushed or 
trampled into humps or ridges.” Thus, the court advances the doctrine 
of modification by relevant circumstances, these being, the size of the 
road network; the location of danger in isolated rural sections; and 
the availability of money, manpower, and machinery. The court also 
feels that certain minimal precautions are required, among them being 
the posting of flares, barricades or other warning signs near the danger 
area.
PERSONAL L IA B IL IT Y  O F H IG H W A Y  O FFICIALS 
L i a b l e
There has been a continuing confusion in this area as to the per­
sonal liability of highway officials for injuries suffered as a result of 
negligence in the performance of ordained duties. There has been ample 
attestation to the seemingly irreconcilable conflict involved in the judi­
cial process, but enough material exists in this area to carve out a 
general majority rule, with certain modifications, as well as minority 
rule. Stated in its simplest form, the majority rule establishes that 
personal liability will accrue to a public official, but as a rule only 
where the duty is ministerial.13 Governmental acts are exempt as we 
discussed earlier. The extant case law in this area goes back into the 
1800’s and we will discuss some of these early decisions. But right now 
I ’d like to mention some recent applications of the law by liability 
minded jurisdictions. In a recent Oregon case, the courts held that 
although county employees may be liable for their negligent acts, the 
highway commissioners are not subject to the doctrine of r e s p o n d e a t  
s u p e r io r  for those actions. The court further held that a county engi­
neer could be held personally liable where there is a duty to supervise 
and order specific details and where such duty is exercised in such a 
manner as to create a dangerous situation.15 6
15 M a t h i s  v. N e l s o n ,  54 S.E. 2d 710 (Ga., 1949); T h o l k e s  v. D e c o c k ,  147 
N.W. 648 (Minn., 1914) ; S m i t h  v. Z i n m e r ,  125 P. 420 (Mont., 1912) ; H a m  v. 
L o s  A n g e l e s  C o u n t y ,  189 Pac. 462, 468 (Cal., 1920) ; P a l m e r  v. M a r c e i l l e ,  
175 A. 31 (Vt., 1934) ; R o b e r t s o n  v. M o n r o e ,  109 A. 495 (N.H., 1920).
16 O g l e  v. B i l l i c k ,  453 P.2d 677 (Ore., 1969).
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An important Pennsylvania case which deserves discussion in some 
detail is the case of M c S p a r r a n  v. H .  J .  W i l l i a m s  C o . ,  249 F.Supp. 
84 (Pa., 1965). This case involved a suit against a county superin­
tendent of highways and his successor upon the theory that they owed 
a statutory duty as well as a common law duty towards the plaintiff’s 
decedents, of generally maintaining the highway in a safe and proper 
condition.
It was alleged that a breach of duty in maintaining and supervising 
the repair of a sinkhole in a highway which was allegedly the instru­
mentality of death, led to the accident.
The main issue was delineated by the court as being whether the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania precludes an action 
against the defendants for their individual torts.
Since the highest state court had not ruled on this issue, which 
would have been precedent for this federal court under the doctrine 
in the E r i e  case, the federal court was left to decide the rule of law.
Looking to the inferior state courts, in the case of S i m o n s o n  v. 
M a r t i n ,  35 Pa. Dist. & Co. R.2d 1 (C.P.Pike County, 1963), the 
judge held that a plaintiff has the right to maintain a trespass action 
to recover damages for negligent performance of official duties by state 
highway officials in their individual capacities and such action would 
not be barred by sovereign immunity. This court further based its 
reasoning on the case of M e a d s  v. R u t t e r ,  122 Pa.Super, 64, 184 A. 
560 (1936), where the court used the following language:
An employee or officer of the commonwealth is not a member of 
a privileged class—exempt from liability for his individual tort. It 
would be unfortunate, indeed, if one, who has sustained a wrong 
by an individual, would be remediless and not able to sue him the 
same as any other citizen because he was an agent, officer or em­
ployee of the commonwealth. Like all others, he must personally 
answer for his wrongful acts, as the doctrine of respondeat superior 
does not prevail against this commonwealth. The rule that a state 
is not liable for the negligence or misfeasance of its officers or agents, 
except where the legislature voluntarily assumes liability, is well 
recognized (citations). ‘The immunity of the state does not extend 
to its officers, and as a general rule state officers and agents are 
personally liable in tort for unauthorized acts committed by them 
in the performance of official duties.’ (citations).
T hat reasoning was accepted by this court in holding that defend­
ants could be sued as individuals for their alleged negligent acts. Such 
action, in the eyes of the court, is not precluded by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.
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Along these lines, a Nevada court had earlier decided that as sover­
eign immunity did not extend to the county in the negligent operations 
of roads, it would not extend to individual county officials.17
A 1960 case in Illinois18 involved an action for wrongful death 
against the county superintendent of highways and the road commis­
sioner for the township. They were charged with negligence in failing 
to properly warn, maintain or repair a road, which negligence resulted 
in the decedent’s demise.
The court looked to precedent and stated that prior to M o l i t o r  v. 
K a n e l a n d  C o m m u n i t y  U n i t  D i s t N o .  3 0 2 ,  163 N.E. 2d 89, the cases 
of T o w n  o f  W a l t h a m  v. K e m p e r , 55 111. 346 and N a g l e  v. W a k e y , 
43 N.E. 1079 had denied recovery on the grounds of governmental pur­
pose. But in M o l i t o r , the court had said that the basic concept under­
lying tort law was that liability follows negligence. Accordingly, and 
in the absence of any reason why liability should not be attached to 
the individuals here, the court refused to dismiss the case but remanded 
it so that the defendants could answer the allegations. However, a 
later Illinois case, discussed in the next section, effectively counters this 
case.
But the earliest applications of liability in these cases arose from an 
implication of the powers and duties of the highway commissioners 
under general law.19 Hence, the early rule of law was that liability 
vested in power and control over roads,20 with the further proviso that 
there be present notification of the defect.21
Finally, the early courts evinced an unbelievable sophistication in 
this area as shown in the case of W  u r z b u r g e r  v. N e l l i s , 130 Pac. 1052 
(Cal., 1913), where the court differentiated between the degree of 
care to be exercised by a road supervisor in a rural district as com­
pared to a city district. In citing Eliot on Roads (3d.Ed) § 497, the 
court said:
— Care is proportioned to the danger that may be reasonably appre­
hended, and duty is measured by the means, opportunities, and obli­
17 R i c e  v. C l a r k  C o u n t y , 382 P.2d 605 (Nev., 1963).
18 K i t t o  v. W a t t l e v u o r t h ,  164 N.E. 2d 817 (111., 1960).
19 B a l t i m o r e  C o u n t y  C o m ’r s  v. W i l s o n ,  54 A. 71 (Md., 1903).
29 B l a c k  v. G u e r n s e y  C o . ,  31 Ohio Cir. Ct. 659 (Ohio, 1909); S m i t h  v. 
W r i g h t ,  24 Barb. 170 (N.Y., 1857); H o v e r  v. B a r k h o o f ,  44 N.Y. 113 (N.Y., 
1870); W a r r e n  v. C l e m e n t ,  24 Hun 472 (N.Y., 1881); D o e q  v. C o o k ,  58 P. 
707 (Cal., 1899) ; A n n e  A r u n d e l  C o u n t y  C o m ’r s  v. C a r r ,  73 A. 668 (Md., 
1909).
21 T h e u l e n  v. V i o l a  T v u p .  o f  A u d u b o n  C o u n t y ,  117 N.W. 26 (Iowa, 1908).
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gations supplied and imposed by the law upon the officers to whom 
is committed the care and control of the public ways of the state. 
It would be plainly unjust to measure the obligations and duties of 
officers in charge of rural highways by the rules which govern offi­
cers placed in charge of the streets of a town or city. W hat would 
be care and diligence on the part of the one class of officers may 
often be culpable negligence on the part of officers of the other class.
N o t  L i a b l e
The minority jurisdictions have advanced many reasons for grant­
ing immunity from suit, ranging from no liability in the absence of 
statute,22 to no liability in the absence of notice,23 to no liability for 
the performance of a governmental function.24 But the very earliest 
decisions were devoid of even these reasons. Case after case stated 
simply that there was no individual liability for injuries sustained by 
reason of defective highways,25 26especially in the absence of a showing 
of malice or willful negligence.20 The case of T e m p l e t o n  v. B e a r d ,  
74 S.E. 735 (N.C., 1912), provides some interesting insights into judi­
cial thinking along these lines. This case involved an action against 
the commissioners for maintaining a dangerous condition by failing to 
provide a bridge over a creek.
The court dismissed the action, holding that no action would be 
against individual board members because there was no charge of mali­
cious or corrupt action, in the absence of which the case involves the 
exercise of discretionary powers. According to this court, general rec­
ognition extended to the fact that in the absence of statutory language 
to the opposite, even ministerial officers acting on questions properly 
arising within their jurisdictions are not liable to suit by individuals.
22 B i n k l e y  v. H u g h e s ,  73 S. W. 2d 111 (Tenn., 1934).
23 S e l l s  v. D e r m o d y ,  86 N.W. 325 (Iowa, 1901).
24 L o n g s t r e e t  v. M e c o s t a  C o u n t y ,  200 N.W. 248 (Mich., 1924) ; S t e v e n s  v. 
N o r t h  S t a t e  M o t o r ,  201 N.W. 435 (Minn., 1925) ; G e n k i n g e r  v. J e f f e r s o n  
C o u n t y ,  93 N.W. 2d 130 (Iowa, 1958) ; I s e m i n g e r  v. B l a c k  H a w k  C o u n t y ,  175 
N.W. 374 (Iowa, 1970) ; B o a r d  o f  C o u n t y  C o m ’r s  v. D a r s t ,  117 N.E. 166 
(Ohio, 1917).
25 W o r d e n  v. W i t t ,  39 P. 1114 (Idaho, 1895) ; G a r l i n g h o u s e  v. J a c o b s ,  29 
N.Y. 297 (N.Y., 1864); M c K e n z i e  v. C h o v i n ,  1 McMull. 222 (S.C., 1841); 
Y o u m a n s  v. T h o r n t o n ,  168 P. 1141 (Idaho, 1917) ; H u f f s t u t t l e r  v. C r a b t r e e ,  
197 Ill.App. 191 (111., 1915); S c o v i l l  v. L o n g e ,  204 Ill.App. 82 (111., 1917); 
R i c h a r d s o n  v. B e l k n a p ,  213 P. 335 (Colo. 1923) ; L y n n  v. A d a m s ,  2 Ind. (2 
CART.) 143 (Ind., 1850); and M c C o n n e l l  v. D e w e y ,  5 Neb. 385 (Neb., 1877).
26 C r o w d e r  v. E m e r y ,  206 Ill.App. 562 (111., 1917); T h o m p s o n  C a l d w e l l  
C o n s t .  C o .  v. Y o u n g ,  294 F. 145 (N.C., 1923).
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In such cases, the officers are clothed with a quasi-judicial capacity and 
the general principle, as quoted in Mechem on public officers, becomes:
The same reasons of private interest and public policy which 
operate to render the judicial officer exempt from civil liability for 
his judicial acts within his jurisdiction apply to the quasi judicial 
officer as well; and it is well settled that the quasi judicial officer 
cannot be called upon to respond in damages to the private individ­
ual for the honest exercise of his judgment within his jurisdiction, 
however erroneous or misguided his judgment may be.—
Finally, an Illinois case in 1969 presented an intriguing alternative 
to the vulnerability of government officials occurring through the loss 
of sovereign immunity. In the case of L u s i e t t o  v. K i n g a n , 246 N.E. 2d 
24 (111., 1969), the appellate court held that the defendant’s duty of 
supervising the maintenance of the portion of the state highway where 
the fatal accident involved here occurred, was one he owed to the 
public generally and not to an individual, hence he could not be held 
individually liable to the plaintiff, and, further, the defendant was 
protected by the immunity that exists in favor of public officials when 
performing duties which are discretionary in nature and not ministerial.
The area within the defendant’s control covered 240 miles of high­
way in five counties. He had 30 men under his supervision. He had 
gone to the scene of the accident subsequent thereto and had personally 
supervised the repairs. There was evidence that he had known that 
this section of the highway was in need of repair for a long time.
The surface of the road was marred by potholes—no warnings or 
barricades were present in the immediate area. The court said:
W e believe that the law is clear that a state highway employee 
may be sued and held individually liable for certain negligent acts 
committed by him in the course of his employment.—
The court further went on to say:
—a legal duty must exist in favor of the person injured and imposed 
on the person whose conduct produces injury. In effect this pre­
cludes the use of government employment as a shield—
But in this case the plaintiff seeks to impose liability solely on the 
basis that the defendant is a government employee. The court felt that 
there was a misconstruction here in trying to impose the state’s duty 
to maintain the highway upon the individual. The individual’s duty to 
supervise was and is a condition of employment. A violation of such, 
unless coupled with some particular responsibility of which there is also 
a violation does not lead to the liability of the individual. The court 
here cited the earlier case of N a g l e  v. W a k e y , 43 N.E. 1079, in which
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it was held that a duty to an individual might ensue in personal lia­
bility, but a duty to the public would not.
Additionally, the court continued that the defendant’s duties were 
not ministerial, but they were governmental in that they required dis­
cretion. There is discretion in choosing which holes to fill and which 
not to fill. All this is done within financial, manpower and equipment 
limitations. The court then said: “ It is a well established principle of 
the common law that an immunity exists in favor of public officials 
when they are exercising their official discretion on matters which are 
discretionary in nature and not ministerial.—”
At this point, the court discusses the principle of the doctrine of 
public officials immunity.
— the duty to keep highways in repair was a duty which re­
quired the exercise of judgment and discretion and that in perform­
ing this duty the commissioners were clothed with discretion as to 
the practicability of making improvements as to the best methods 
to be employed, they were therefore protected by this theory of 
immunity.—
It is this theory which the court accepts here. The court further 
said that although M o l i t o r  v. K a n e l a n d  C o m m .  U n i t  S c h o o l  D i s t . ,  163 
N.E.2d 89, abolished governmental immunity it did not alter the doc­
trine of public officials’ immunity. The case of K e l l e y  v. O g i l v i e , 212 
N.E. 2d 279, decided after the M o l i t o r  decision recognized the doc­
trine, and since no overt overruling of N a g l e  cited above, in which 
the doctrine is first expressed, has taken place in the state supreme 
court, this court accepts the principles of that case as law.
